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The Transformation Thesis of Morton J. Horwitz:
Research Problems and Implications for the Practice
of Liberal Democracy
Samuel J. Astorino*
Whatever else may be said about Critical Legal Studies ("CLS"),
no extended argument is required to demonstrate that its academic
members have had a striking impact on the writing of American
legal history. Within this particular growing body of historical
literature, the work of Morton J. Horwitz of the Harvard Law
School is preeminent in tracing the evolving contours of American
law. Perhaps no other recent scholar writing about the history of
American law has evoked such a large amount of praise, comment,
and criticisn. Horwitz has become effectively the standard to beat,
the benchmark against which to judge, and the central interpreter
of the subject, either to affirm or deny. His appeal to legal
historians, at least, is traceable to the fact that he was "coming as
close as legal historians can ever come to identifying a paradigm
shift. His argument ...
was, quite simply a formidable act to
* Ph.D. University of Pittsburgh, J.D. Duquesne University School of Law. Professor of
Law, Duquesne University School of Law.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 36:1

follow.",
The essence of this paradigm shift, as pronounced by Horwitz,
has been the politicization of American law. No other historian has
devoted so much careful attention to the subject of political
adjudication as a reality in the face of persistent efforts to mask
legal reasoning as a neutral, nonpolitical exercise. 2 The failure to
recognize the ideological nature of American jurisprudence forms
the driving force of his work, as well as the basis of any CLS
political agenda. Horwitz, therefore, is an academic with an
attitude, devoting his skills to the deconstruction of the taught
formalistic tradition of American law and to the construction of a
realistic view that politics are, and should be, inextricably bound
up with the making of law.
Following the publication of several articles that would later
form chapters of his first book, Horwitz broke provocatively on the
scene of American historiography in 1977 with the publication of
The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, 3 winning the
coveted Bancroft Prize in American History that year. Designating it
"a different work," rather than a sequel, fifteen years later came a
second volume entitled, The Transformation of American Law,
1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy.4 Apparently, what
remains to be written is a third volume on the subject of the
influence of the Civil War on American legal history, 5 and another
covering the years since 1960.
We are now sufficiently distant from both volumes to assess
Horwitz's capacity to inform and influence the American legal
tradition. As in the case of Transformation I, Transformation II
has engendered numerous reviews, often constituting lengthy
scholarly essays in themselves, on the subject of Horwitz's work in
the aggregate and its place in the historiography of American law.6
1. Neil Duxbury, The Theory and History of American Law and Politics, 13 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 250 (1993).
2. Morton J. Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal
History, 17 AK J. OF LEGAL Hisr. 275 (1973) (constituting an attack on the defense by Roscoe
Pound of the "taught legal tradition" of politically-neutral law).
3. MoRroN J. HoRwrrz THE TRANSFORMATION OF AnaicAN LAw, 1780-1860 (1977)
c("RANSFORMAmON r'.
4. MORTON J. HoRwrrz, ThE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1870-1960. THE CRms OF
LEGAL ORTHODoxy (1992) CTRAN FoRMATION Ir).
5. Id. at vii. It remains a souce of puzzlement that while Horwitz correctly underscores
the dramatic influence of the war on legal discourse, he chose to write on the period from
1870 to 1960 prior to furnishing an account of the war's impact.
6. See generally references throughout this article. The best summary of the critics of
TRANSnui iToN I is Wythe Holt, Morton Hortotz and the Transformation of American Legal
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Horwitz's work is clearly revisionist, in that it challenges
specifically the orthodox view that law in this country is
nonpolitical and hermetically insulated against social, economic,
and political influences. That is to say that law reacts and
progresses according to its own inner logic, rather than to
extra-legal social forces. Horwitz thus takes his place in a long line
of revisionist historians, led by Charles Austin Beard, 7 who have set
their pens to critique almost every facet of American history.8
The purpose of this writing is not to undertake a comprehensive
review of the two Transformation volumes. That task has been
performed ably by others who have predominantly rated Horwitzian
scholarship in the highest terms while, of course, identifying some
shortcomings. 9 The approach taken here follows the suggestion of
the legal historian, John Henry Schlegel, who, while praising the
excellence of Transformation II, found certain "tempting targets"
on which to focus "my carping." 10 Any analysis, however, must
inevitably compare the two volumes, at least in cursory terms, in
order to pick out particular problems to be discussed. In more
specific terms, here attention will be devoted to the problems of
research methodology and, more importantly, to the implicit
consequences of Horwitz's thesis of law-as-politics for the
democratic system of government established by the United States
Constitution.
In general, American historiography in the period between the
two World Wars was largely dominated by revisionist progressive
historians who concluded that the nation's history was deeply
colored by a sharp struggle between the wants of "the people" and
the conflicting desires of "the interests." Standing astride this
progressive historiography were such luminaries of the historical
profession as Charles A. Beard, Vernon L Parrington, and Carl
Becker. Beard, in particular, lorded over revisionism with his
insistence that even the Constitution itself was the product of "the
interests," a theme that permeated the revisionist view of the rest
of American history."1 As to legal history, Beard equally argued that,
History, 23 Wh. & MARY L REv. 663 (1982).
7. It is common to see Horwitz as a Beardian disciple in every sense.
8. RIcHARD HoFsrADTEr, TH PROGREssivE HISmANS (1968).
9. See, e.g., G. Edward White, Transforming History in the Postmodern Era, 91 McR
L REV. 1315 (1993); Daniel R Ernst, The Critical Tradition in the Writing of American
Legal History, 102 YA L. 1019 (1993); Duxbury, supra note 1.
10. John Henry Schlegel, A Thsty Tidbit, 41 BunF. L REv. 1045, 1046 (1993).
11. CHAwim A BEARD, AN ECONOWC INTERPRErATION OF THE CONsTrrLrTON OF THE UNITED
STATas (1935); CHARLIs A BEARD & MARY R BARD, THE RISE OF AMEmCAN CI
TIoN (1930).
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despite their claim to neutral adjudication based on logic, judges
actually decided cases on the basis of their particular economic
interests. These interests were conservative, anti-reformist, and
almost always supportive of an economic system devoted to
exploitation in the drive for profit.
The end of the Second World War brought about a dramatic shift
in American historiography. A consensus interpretation that
celebrated the absence of criticism and conflict, deriving mainly
from Lockean thought, soon became the dominant mode of
historical thought. Counted among the foremost proponents of
consensus history were Daniel Boorstin, Richard Hofstadter, and
Louis Hartz, whose book, The Liberal Traditionin America (1955),
provided the bible of the new history. Rejecting the thesis of social
conflict, consensus historians argued that in the antebellum period
and beyond, legislators and jurists alike simply fashioned a system
of regulation, franchises, and monopolies designed to promote
economic growth without reference to ideological motives.
Between the Beard and Hartz approaches, the confrontation
between conflict and consensus was established. In 1964, when
both views were well-known in academic circles, Horwitz
completed his doctoral dissertation entitled, The Problem of the
Tyranny of the Majority in American Thought, under the tutelage
of Louis Hartz. Following graduation from the Harvard Law School
and serving a one-year clerkship in a federal court, he was
12
appointed to the law faculty at Harvard.
Transformation I, nevertheless, adopted a revisionist posture,
despite Horwitzs apparent intellectual linkage with Hartz. Although
he refrained from using the word "conspiracy," his detractors
quickly labeled the book as preaching nothing less. His conclusion
that an alliance between elite lawyers and "newly powerful
commercial and entrepreneurial interests" created the "tendency of
subsidy through legal change during this period [which] ...
dramatically ...
[threw] the burden of economic development on
the weakest and least active elements in the population." 13 Legal
developments in antebellum America were seen as the conscious
result of efforts by powerful elites from business, the bar, and the
judiciary to shape the law as an instrument forged deliberately to
secure economic growth at the expense of the less fortunate.
12. Ernst, supra note 9, at 1023-26.
13. TRANSFORMATION I, supra note 3, at 101, 258-59. An extended rendition of the
"subsidy thesis" is found in the article by Gary T Schwartz, 7brt Law and the Economy in
Nineteenth Century America A Reinterpretation,90 YALz L. 1717, 1718 (1981).
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Horwitz called this style of legal reasoning "instrumentalism."
rejecting
the traditional
approach of
Methodologically
concentrating on "constitutional history," Horwitz's Transformation
I dealt almost exclusively with developments in the common law
subjects of torts, contracts, and property. Most important, for
present purposes, was that his offer of proof for his thesis was
based on a detailed examination of statutes and case law on a
state-by-state basis, as well as treatises and commentaries. In this
fashion, he appeared to follow the traditional method of historical
research by lining up the doctrinal evidence of the cases and
construing them to prove his point. Proper documentation
constituted the architecture of his work. The research, moreover,
emphasized his belief that changes in legal doctrine were caused by
extra-legal social phenomena, especially the demands of external
market forces being imposed on the law by the alliance of bench,
14
bar, and business.
Doctrinal research, therefore, was the methodological mainstay
of Transformation L Its pages are filled with such a quantity of
case analysis as to dazzle the reader with the obvious energy and
detailed research that went into its formulation. It was this very
research that was seized upon by challengers who questioned his
methods by concluding that often he had been careless in reading
the cases or had distorted them to suit his own purposes. 15 In their
view, Transformation I "was a provocative thesis in search of
16
evidence, resting more on rhetoric and passion than on fact."
Horwitz's research simply failed to prove that a bench-bar-business
relationship ever existed; and relied on his intuition that somehow
economic power inevitably teams up with legal power to produce
14. White, supra note 9, at 1329-30; James T. Kloppenberg, The Theory and Practiceof
American Legal History, 106 HAv. L REv. 1332, 1338 (1993) ("In his previous book, Horwitz
concentrated on showing the relation between changes in the law and changes in the
socioeconomic realm"). For an analysis of such causation, see Louis E. Wolcher, The Many
Meanings of "Wherefore" in Legal History, 68 WASh L REv. 559 (1993) (with references to
Horwitz at 6064)7). This type of "but for" causation was also the methodological approach of
the first edition of the classic work by IAWRENCE M. FRIzMAN, A HISroRY OF AMERICAN LAW
(1973).
15. Schwartz, supra note 13; A.W.B. Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of
Contracts, 46 U. C. L 1,Ev. 533 (1979); R. Randall Bridwell, Theme v. Reality in American
Legal History: A Commentary on Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law,
1780-1860, and on the Common Law in America, 53 IND. LI. 449 (1978); John R Reid, A
Plot 7bo Doctrinaire,55 Tax L REv. 1307 (1977); Grant Gilmore, From Tort to Contract.Industrialization and the Law, 86 YALE L. 788 (1977); Harry N. Scheiber, Back to "The
Legal Mind?" DoctrinalAnalysis and the History of Law, 5 REv. AhL HiSm. 458 (1977).

16. White, supra note 9, at 1318-19.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 36:1

results favorable to their combined interests. 17
Transformation II, on the other hand, adopted a strikingly
different approach to the matter of proof and causation. Where its
predecessor had ransacked case law to prove the existence of its
instrumentalist metaexplanation, Transformation II, for the most
part, offered a penetrating discourse on what legal scholars have
said and theorized about the law. It thereby deviated starkly from
the previous emphasis on cause-and-effect supported by doctrinal
evidence. Transformation II emerges as an intellectual history of
legal academics and their ideas during the period covered by the
book.18
The narrative of Transformation II conveys a now familiar story
involving the succession of responses to the formalism taught by
Christopher Columbus Langdell at Harvard a century ago. Adopting
the terminology of his CLS colleague at Harvard, Duncan Kennedy,
Horwitz begins his study with a scathing depiction of formalism as
the "Structure of Classical Legal Thought. 19 In summnary,
Langdellian formalism has two pernicious facets in its legal
repertoire. First, it insists that law proceeds according to its own
inner logic based on deductive principles emanating from case law.
Law is neutral, therefore, and nonpolitical, because legal reasoning
does not, and should not, react to external social forces. Under
Horwitz's insistence that law is politics, the corrosive nature of
Langdellian legal thought marks it as the chief enemy of progress.
Secondly, the static nature of formalism, with its grounding in case
law, was responsible, in Horwitz's view, for the failure of the legal
system to provide simple justice in the era of Big Business and
industrialization. In the hands of the formalists, law was "reified" (a
term very frequently employed by Horwitz) in the sense that legal
categories were abstracted from reality along thick bright lines.
These abstractions were operational organizing principles of the
law (i.e., negligence, consideration, strict liability, etc.). 20 Here was
"law in the books," rather than "law in action" as formulated by
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Roscoe Pound, and Benjamin Cardozo.
17. Despite his wish to write for general historians, TRANSFORMATION I proved to be
often incomprehensible to them, as well as to practitioners. See Samuel J. Astorino, History
and Legal Discourse: The Language of the New Legal History, 23 DuQ. L REv. 363 (1985).
18. While falling outside the intent and purpose of this article, it is important of course,
to understand the reasons for this shift as a reaction to TRANSFORMATION I by Horwitz's

colleagues in the CIS movement See Schlegel, supra note 10, at 1054-55.
19. Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness.
The Case of CassicalLegal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 RES L & Soc. 3 (1980).
20. TRANSFORMATION H, supra note 4, at 11-15.
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Ultimately, the insulation of law from politics "sowed the seeds
of its own destruction."21 The classical system, given its support of
a free market system that had become monopolistic, could no
longer speak to the issue of a "just distribution of wealth," leading
to a "crisis of legitimacy."2
By the turn of the twentieth century, legal thinkers, led by
Roscoe Pound at Harvard and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., mounted
a "progressive" attack on this "mechanical jurisprudence."2 In turn,
the succeeding Legal Realists of the 1920's and 1930's were the
"culmination of the early-twentieth-century attack on the claims of
the late-nineteenth-century classical legal thought to have produced
an autonomous and self-executing system of legal thought."24
Finally, after seeking to demolish the claims of the legal process
school of Henry Hart and Albert Sacks in the 1950's, Horwitz closes
with an impassioned plea that the Critical Legal Studies movement,
rather than Law and Economics, is the rightful heir to the
Progressive-Realist legacy.
Taken together, the two Transformation volumes tell the history
of American law in three parts. Transformation I, of course,
chronicles that history during the period from 1780 to the Civil War.
The second part comprises the first chapter of Transformation II:
the advent of classical-formalist law. The third part, the remainder
of Transformation II, is a rendition of intellectual opinion
regarding the perniciousness of classical legal thought in America.
What holds the parts together, of course, is the theme of
law-as-politics. Instrumentalism was result-oriented law that in the
hands of the alliance of bench, bar, and business intentionally tilted
law in favor of certain politically fashionable economic goals,
culminating in the creation of a capitalist national market system.
Having once achieved its ends, formalism froze those legal
achievements in place by conceptualizing law as static abstracted
formulas resistant to further change. Where instrumentalism
redistributed wealth, formalism sought to prevent any further
21. Id, at 15.
22. Id, at 66.
23. While the term "progressive' implied adherence to the great reform movement by
the same name, in legal thought the term meant the attack on formalism. Progressive legal
thinkers were the legal counterpart to progressive political reformers. Horwitz's chapter in
TRANSFORMATION 1U on Holmes was originally available to students at Harvard in
mimeographed form. In this work, Horwitz stated that Oliver Wendell Holmes is "the most
important and influential legal thinker America has had" TRANSrOPMATION U, supm note 4, at

109.
24.

TRMATOM

TMN II, supra note 4, at 193.
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distribution at the behest of popular majorities by building a wall
of separation between instrumentalist legal ideas and a neutral
apolitical system of adjudication. The fear of the formalists was
that an unchecked majority also could play the same game of
redistribution through the deployment of law-as-politics. The third
part of Horwitz's vision is the role played by progressive legal
intellectuals in their efforts to unpack and exorcise the sin of
formalism from the soul of American law.
As noted by most reviewers, however, Transformation II is "a
different book." The reasons for the disjunction between it and the
first volume has been the source of intense speculation generated
by Horwitz's own subjective attachment to a theoretical motif.6
What has escaped attention, however, has been the compelling
perspectives of historical inquiry that separate the two volumes and
raise serious questions about legal science and research
methodology.
Transformation I encompassed the view that, in order to prove
that instrumentalism really existed in the legal system, it was
essential to research cases and statutes, in particular. As already
noted, much of the criticism fell precisely on that point: that the
research was thin or misguided. In any event, Horwitz had engaged
in a traditional form of research. Implicit in this methodology,
moreover, is a recognition that "law" means what the courts and
legislators decide. If the legal historian wants to know how law
was transformed, she should look at the actual conduct of the
law-givers themselves, and the resulting cases and statutes, as
evidence of the covering theory.
By contrast, Transformation II is largely devoid of this type of
research. What accounts for the difference? It is suggested here
that at least one plausible answer can be found in the very last
sentence of Transformation II
Until we are able to transcend the American fixation with
sharply separating law from politics, we will continue to
fluctuate between the traditional polarities of American legal
discourse, as each generation continues frantically to hide
behind unhistorical and abstract universalisms in order to
deny, even to itself, its own political and moral choices. 26
Where is the proof of this fixation, of the application of
"unhistorical and abstract universalisms?" Aside from an emphasis
25.
26.

See, e.g., White, supra note 9, at 1350.
TRANSFDRMAnTON II, supra note 4, at 272.
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on Constitutional cases, especially Lockner,27 Horwitz's lament
appears to flow from a presumption that because so many of his
legal heroes have manned the intellectual trenches, the formalist
enemy must have been on the field. As in the physical sciences,
certain observable facts prove the existence of the unseen.
What is missing in all of this is scholarly proof that formalism
has been alive and well also in common law jurisprudence during
the last century. In short, it is required as a matter of scholarly
integrity that the research methodology informing Transformation
I be undertaken for the years 1870 to 1960. Only then will the legal
historian be certain that Horwitz's heroes were fighting a live
enemy. Perhaps we may even discover that the emperor had no
clothes.
The task of completing that kind of research is daunting to say
the least. The present status of research in the field of American
legal history, despite a significant influx of double-degree scholars
into the field and the creation of legal history courses in law
schools, does not offer much optimism. Unlike general history and
political science departments, where thousands of theses and
dissertations have uncovered probably all we need to know
factually about American history, law schools do not enjoy the
advantage of having busy graduate students poking into every nook
and cranny of our experience to compile a body of
historiographical literature from which metaexplanations may flow.
It will not do to employ the term "American Law" in one sense in
Transformation I and then use the very same language in
Transformation II, but mean something quite different. For not
only can such usage be intrinsically misleading, but becomes more
so because it could be easily presumed that the thick overlay of
theory girding Transformation H is an acceptable response to
accurate factual data. The legal historian must be cautious lest her
theory be one in search of evidence.
This line of criticism suggestively parallels the insight of John
Henry Schlegel who has uncovered a major gap in Horwitz's
research that has also been noticed by other reviewers of the
Transformation volumes. Schlegel points to a significant omission
in the Horwitzian thesis: the causal failure to provide proof of the
alliance between bench and bar on one side and business on the
27. Lockner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Horwitzs case index in TRANSFOmTmoN II
consists almost totally of United States Supreme Court cases, among which Lockner is the
most frequently cited by far. TRIANSFORKATION II, supra note 4, at 349-50.
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other. Schlegel, of course, is not looking for an explicit agreement
by these elites to engage in instrumentalism; no written memoranda
of law, or contract, or recordings of table talk exists on point.
Rather, Schlegel points to the research of his colleague, Alfred S.
Konefsky, that traces the style of research that answers "the more
general question of how ideas or broader cultural understandings
arise in a community and are transmitted between and among its
members."2 Horwitz did not use Konefsky's work and has had to
live with the problem of failing to successfully link elite actors
who, as Konefsky demonstrates, shared the same space, status, and
consciousness about the direction of the nation.
Did Horwitz merely presume the existence of linkage? More
particularly, and in like fashion, in Transformation II, has he
presumed the existence of classical-formalist practice because of
reverence for the words of his intellectual ancestors? If Americans
have failed to face openly the fact that law is, and has been,
politics and morality, how then to explain the Warren Court, the
New Deal decisions, Roe v. Wade, and the outright politicization of
the process of selecting Supreme Court Justices and federal judges
except in political and moral terms?29 It would certainly come as a
shock to many today, especially present-day conservatives, to learn
that many legal decisions, of at least the United States Supreme
Court, are not politically motivated. To repeat the point. only
proper research on the possible existence of formalism will tell us
whether the emperor wore clothes. s°
28. Schlegel, supra note 10, at 1049 (citing Alfred S. Konefsky, Law and Culture in
Antebellum Boston, 40 STAN. L REv. 1119 (1988)).
29. Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice, 50 WASH. & LEE L

REv. 5 (1993).
30. In another sense, on this point, the legal historian should be sensitive to the
counsel of the CLS scholar, Robert Gordon, who stated that readers are justified in asldng
the "Crits"to:
embed their story in a narrative context that would at least supply subjects and
occaswns to the narrative to show that it is human beings with reasons and motives,
not disembodied Spirits, who drive the manufacture of legal concepts. Who pushed
which arguments? What happened to destabilize previously stable conventions? We
ought to have a rule of style: no sentence without a subject; no intellectual move
without a reason . . . even if the particular subject and reason may sometimes be
largely incidental to the grander thematic history of legal consciousness.
Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L REv. 57, 119 (1984).
Schlegel, supra note 10, at 1059, quoted this passage from Gordon to support his
contention that Horwitz missed the entire issue of employing research in social relations to
establish the link between lawyers and entrepreneurs. This author argues that Horwitz was
equally remiss in not telling his readers whether static formalism is still dominant in legal

practice and whether, in fact, it ever existed at all.
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Perhaps no other student of American law has been as open and
forthright as Horwitz in demanding unqualified recognition that law
is politics. In taking this stand, Horwitz has firmly rejected
counter-proposals for adhering to neutral principles in law, for
curtailing judicial activism, and for limiting the notion that the
Constitution is a "living" document to be interpreted and adapted
by different people to different circumstances. 31 Although it may be
commonplace for lawyers often to secretly smirk when it is
suggested that judicial opinions are politically motivated, there still
remains a deep resistance to admitting that we are a society of
men rather than laws and that judges make, but do not discover,
law. The distrust of judicial activism or law-as-politics lies deeply
rooted in our political and legal culture, stretching from Jefferson's
famous complaint to Madison that judicial activists are "sappers
and miners working underground" to destroy the Republic to
Lincoln's equally famous fear of judicial tyranny. Given that
Jefferson and Lincoln are the two greatest theoreticians of
democracy ever produced by this country, it is remarkable that so
little attention has been paid to the implications for the American
Constitutional system raised by Horwitzs unequivocal call for a
rule that politics should guide the courts.
Surely the most dramatic exhibition of Horwitz's insistent
demand has been his stern reaction to Herbert Wechsler's criticism
of Brown v. Board of Education.32 Judge Learned Hand and
Wechsler gave the Holmes Lectures at Harvard in 1958 and 1959,
respectively. While it is incontrovertible that both men abhorred
racial segregation, they nevertheless were convinced that Broum,
while morally correct, lacked a principled basis. 33 Where Judge
Hand denied any Constitutional basis for the power of judicial
review, Wechsler and the legal process school concluded that
opinions must be grounded in neutral principles (albeit with a
decidedly progressive result). Horwitz finds this line of reasoning to
be a smokescreen designed to hide the fact that the legal process
See Joseph W Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL L REv. 465 (1988), concluding that
formalism has been defeated. Singer's article was a lengthy critique of LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL
REAusM AT YALz, 1927-1960 (1986). Horwitz indicated that he agreed with Singer's
interpretation. TRANSFORMATION R, supra note 4, at 308 n.7.
31. Horwitz, supra note 29, at 8 ('A constitution meant to endure for ages can only
endure if it adapts to different views held under different circumstances."). Id
32. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33. Judge Hand's lectures were published under the title, THE BiLL OF RIGHTS (1958);
Wechsler's views were spelled out in his classic article, 7bward Neutral Principles of

ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. Rnv. 1 (1959).

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 36:1

approach was, in reality, a return to formalist thought. Wechsler's
argument, in Horwitz's view, "seems positively astonishing" because
"Wechsler achieved neutrality through formalism ...
a new
conservative formulation in orthodox legal thought."34
The issue at hand, however, is not only whether Horwitz's history
is correct. For in addition to the throaty criticism of his earlier
research, his constitutional history, especially in the area of
property rights, has been attacked as a "simplification" and
mono-causal in tone without appreciation of the complexities that
went into making the American founding document.35 That aside,
the remaining crucial question is why Horwitz is at pains to
champion the politicization of law. Where Wechsler saw that an
abandonment of principled legal reasoning would lead to a serious
public loss of confidence in the judiciary, Horwitz's concluding
sentence in Transformation II, as noted earlier, chides us for
hiding behind "law," thereby "denying" ourselves the benefits of
moral choices.
It is not enough, of course, to argue that, given his interpretation
of American legal history, he could arrive at no other conclusion.
Historians, including Horwitz, are fully capable of separating their
subjects from their politics. After all, to study war, or barbarism, or
totalitarianism does not mean to embrace them as one's values.
The problem arises in a three-fold manner. The first is the
marked tendency to draw "lessons" from history and formulate
them into pronounced political causes. The second is to permit the
political agenda to double-back on the history. The third is to fail
to tell readers how and why the historian arrived at political values
through historical research. The threshold problem confronting
Horwitz's thesis is that since he believes that objectivity is either
dead or impossible, it is permissible to load the argument by
setting up his history so that the Realists (and now CLS) win. Nor
is it defensible to couch conclusions as mere aspirations for
historians "to give the best possible explanation of their historical
subjects."36 His history fails to critique his heroes, and fails to
understand that there were other sides to the story he tells. 37 At
least one of those other sides is the haunting implication that the
thesis of law-as-politics poses for the American system of
government.
34.
35.
36.
37.

TRANSFORMATION II, supra note 4, at 267-68.
Kloppenberg, supra note 14, at 1347.
TRANSFORMATON I, supra note 4, at viii
White, supra note 9, at 1351-52.
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In many respects, it is this failure to articulate the political
context that causes the greatest difficulty. As observed by Neil
Duxbury, it is impossible in Horwitz's world to distinguish between
good and bad political outcomes of judicial decisions: Lockner or
Brown? "To profess, as Horwitz does, that law and politics are not
separate, is simply to re-emphasize rather than to tackle the
issue."-"
On what basis should a political judicial decision trump the
power of the legislature? If courts should make political decisions,
should they not be subject to the vicissitudes of the ballot? If law
is politics, what does this say about the Nazi judges who defended
themselves on the grounds that they were merely following orders
issued by the political regime? Even they quoted Holmes.O Finally,
who will guard the guards?
The problem, of course, has been inherent in progressive legal
scholarship from the very beginning. Roscoe Pound, for one,
ultimately concluded that bureaucratic administrative bodies would
prove to be the forerunners of absolutism by destroying the rule of
law. Holmes and Cardozo emphasized, to the contrary, the need for
a jurist to act as a legislator. Carried forth into Legal Realism, there
has always been a very real question of how law-as-politics impacts
on a civil polity that is based on a separation of powers that
establishes at least one major safeguard against an overreaching
judiciary.
In reality, of course, we have more than a faint notion of how
Horwitz would separate the good from the bad. The CLS vision of
structuralism was pioneered by the illiberalism of French political
thought after the birth of French radicalism in the 1930's.
Illiberalism included different types of Marxism, structuralism,
Heideggerianism with John-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and
Louis Althusser. Structuralism, in turn, was formulated by Claude
Levi-Strauss in anthropology, Roland Barthes in literary criticism,
Jacques Lacan in psychoanalysis, and Michel Foucault and Jacques
Derrida in social criticism. Although structuralism remained
suspicious and critical of Marxism, it agreed with Marxism's
38. Duxbury, supra note 1, at 270.
39. 7ral of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military 7 bunals under Control
Council Law No. 10, Nuremberg, October, 1946 - April, 1949, II: 33 (1951) (quoting
Holmes to the effect that decisions follow considerations of a political or social nature,
rather than solely logic or general legal doctrines). It should be pointed out that Horwitz
says almost nothing about the effects of Nuernberg on the Realists, except for a sketchy
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hostility towards the Western liberal state, in particular, the free
market system.
The gyrations of structuralism within CLS circles need not detain
the reader here. 4° The point to be emphasized is their pervasive
law-as-politics
perspective,
interlocked
with
Horwitzian
historiography, that might reveal the deep structures of American
structuralist thought itself and, most importantly, how that thought
comes to terms, if at all, with American Constitutionalism. Except
to say that courts rule by fiat, so that even the boldest political
decisions have their own unquestioning force, perhaps the
law-as-politics policy is incompatible with American democratic
practice under the Constitution. At the very least, it now appears,
however, that the radical thought of the French fountainhead has
shifted from adherence to illiberalism to an embrace of the
41
liberalism of Leo Strauss and John Rawls.
Now, if that happened to Morton J. Horwitz, it would constitute
the intellectual paradigm shift of all paradigm shifts. But then, the
field of American legal history would cease to be as interesting, as
informed, or as much fun.
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